Critical review of the (second wave) optimal tax theories by Josheski, Dushko & Boskov, Tatjana
Critical review of the (second wave) optimal tax theories  
 
Dushko Josheski  , Tatjana Boshkov 
University Goce Delcev-Shtip , R.North Macedonia 
 
 
Abstract  
 
James Mirrlees (1971) launched the second wave of optimal tax models by suggesting a way to 
formalize the planner’s problem that deals explicitly with unobserved heterogeneity among 
taxpayers.So, in this paper optimal income taxation theories are subject of investigation following the 
classic paper in public finance by Mirrlees (1971). This provides analytical solutions for the second-
best efficient tax system in presence of such an adverse selection. Until late 1990s, Mirrlees results 
were not closely connected to empirical tax studies and had little impact on tax policy 
recommendations. Next, the famous result Diamond-Mirrlees efficiency theorem Diamond-Mirrlees 
(1971a), Diamond-Mirrlees (1971b),has been reviewed. This theorem is important because it states 
that there should be no taxes on intermediate goods, and that private and public production should 
be based on same prices. Also, taxation should not violate efficiency of production. Solution to the 
Mankiw problem on the other hand states that small open economy, labor bears 100% of small capital 
income tax. 
Keywords: Optimal taxation, asymmetric information, Diamond-Mirrlees efficiency theorem, 
Mankiw problem 
Introduction  
 
The subject of the optimal design of tax system has been topic that has long fascinated economic 
theorist. This paper explores some theories that policy makers must consider when designing optimal 
tax systems. Mainly the material in this paper draws material  from the very important paper ,actually 
the foundation of modern tax theory  by Mirrlees (1971). Some lessons from the optimal tax theory 
are presented in this paper also namely: Optimal tax schedule depends on the shape of the distribution 
of the ability, the optimal marginal income tax schedule could incline at high incomes, a flat tax with 
a universal lump-sum transfer could be optimal, the extent of redistribution rises with wage inequality, 
taxes should depend on the ability (some personal characteristics such as IQ and the working 
hours),only final goods to be taxed (no taxes on intermediate goods), capital income ought to be 
untaxed, also Mankiw problem shows that that in a small open economy, labor bears 100% of small 
capital income tax. This paper is divided in following sections: at first it starts with the literature 
review, followed by the explanation of the Mirrlees (1971) model ,which is better understood under 
Saez (2001). This section is briefly followed by the Daimond-Mirrlees theorem Diamond-Mirrlees 
(1971a), Diamond-Mirrlees (1971b). This section is followed by the Mankiw problem and its solution. 
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Mankiw problem was posted online by Nicholas Gregory Mankiw, on his blog1. Later paper finishes by 
the conclusions part.  
Literature review 
The central element of the theory of optimal taxation is information. Public policies apply to the 
individuals based on what the government knows about them. Second welfare theorem states, that 
where several convexity and continuity assumptions are satisfied, an optimum is a competitive 
equilibrium once initial endowments have been suitably distributed. Mirrlees (1986), elaborates that 
a good way of governing is to agree upon objectives, then to discover what is possible and to optimize. 
In general, complete information about the consumers for the transfers is required to make the 
distribution requires, so the question of feasible lump-sum transfers arises here. Usually the optimal 
tax systems combine flat marginal tax rate plus lump sum grants to all the individuals(so that the 
average tax rate rises with income even if the marginal does not), Mankiw NG, Weinzierl M, Yagan 
D.(2009)2. The choice of the optimal redistributive tax involves tradeoffs between three kinds of 
effects : equity effect (it changes the distribution of income) , the efficiency effect form reducing the 
incentives, the insurance effect from reducing the variance of individual income streams, 
Varian,H.R.(1980). Diamond, Helms and Mirrlees (1978),analyze the presence of uncertainty in the 
analysis of optimal taxation, with Cobb-Douglas utility function, with elasticity of substitution between 
labor and leisure <1 s that backward bending labor supply curve can be observed. Two period model 
with uncertainty showed how stochastic economies differ from the economies without uncertainty, 
since these second-best insurance/redistribution programs differ in the outcomes from the first best 
result economies without government intervention. In general, Varian (1980) finds for linear and non-
linear optimal tax, that if the consumption values are bounded, the optimal tax will always exist and 
would be a continuous function of observed income. In early contribution Ramsey (1927) , supposed 
that the planner must raise tax revenue only through imposition of tax on commodities only. In his 
model taxes should be imposed in inverse proportion to the representative customer’s elasticity of 
demand for the good, so that commodities with more inelastic demand are taxed more heavily. 
Governments in real world however cannot observe individual ability.  Mirrlees (1971) , in the basic 
version of the model allowed individuals to differ in their innate ability. The planer can observe 
income, but the planner cannot observe ability or effort.  By recognizing unobserved heterogeneity, 
diminishing marginal utility of consumption, and incentive effects, the Mirrlees approach formalizes 
the classical tradeoff between efficiency and equity. In this framework the optimal tax problem is a 
problem of imperfect information between taxpayers and the social planner. Saez (2001) argued that 
“unbounded distributions are of much more interest than bounded distributions to address high 
income optimal tax rate problem”. In all the cases that Saez (2001) investigated (four cases)3 the 
optimal tax rates are clearly U-shaped. This paper by using the elasticity estimates from the literature, 
the formula for the asymptotic top rates suggests that the marginal rates for the labor income should 
not be lower than 50% and they could be as much as high as 80%.Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a) and 
Diamond, Mirrlees (1971b) , are proposing alternative in Ramsey proposition by allowing the social 
planer to considers a numerous tax systems. In the first paper Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a), they 
prove how some market imperfections  eg. capital market imperfections (consumers can lend but not 
borrow), the market situation will alter the optimal tax structure. Diamond and Mirrlees (1971b), are 
proposing tax rules for single good economy (changes on demand due to the tax structure differ from 
proportionality with larger than average percentage fall in the demand for goods with large income 
 
1  http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2017/10/an-exercise-for-my-readers.html  
2 A key determinant of the optimal tax schedule (tax bracket) is the shape of the ability of the distribution.  
3 Utilitarian criterion, utility type I and II and Rawlsian criterion, utility type I and II.  
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derivatives (elasticities)) ,in three-good economy the tax rate is proportionately greater  for a good 
with smaller cross elasticity of compensated demand with the price of labor, in many commodities 
economy , households with low social marginal income utility predominate among the purchasers of 
the commodity, that commodity should be taxed more heavily, and vice versa, this taxation increases 
total welfare. Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a), continue to point out that there should not be taxation 
on intermediate goods such as capital held by the producers, also see Judd (1999).The general result 
Judd (1999) finds is that optimal tax on capital should be zero except for the initial period. Judd (1985), 
also found a zero optimal long-run capital income tax rate for steady states of the general competitive 
equilibrium and heterogeneous infinitely-lived agents with non-separable preferences.  But the 
famous Atkinson,Stiglitz (1976) results(result on the role of indirect taxation with an optimal nonlinear 
income tax) states that commodity taxes are not useful under these assumptions about the utility 
function: weak separability of function, and homogeneity across individuals in sub-utility of 
consumption. The Atkinson-Stiglitz result is obtained by embedding the Ramsey model within Mirrlees 
model. Also zero-top tax rate suggest important task for the policy makers to identify the shape of the 
high-end of the ability distribution (they cannot observe the effort and ability in direct way but they 
can observe income).  Tuomala (1990), confirms that marginal tax rate decreases as income increases 
except at income levels within a bottom decile. Ordover, J.,  Phelps,E. (1979), provided that if 
consumption have weakly separable utility functions and government has instruments that allow it to 
fix the capital stock on the socially optimal level, then the optimal tax rate on capital is zero, Salanie 
(2003). Chamley (1986), results on zero capital income tax states: “When the consumption decisions 
in a given period have only a negligible effect on the structure of preferences for  periods in the distant 
future, then the second-best tax rate on capital income tends to zero in the long run”. But these are 
(Ramsey capital income tax )two period models if more periods are included than the optimal tax 
formula would be more complex, as in Auerbach, Kotlikoff (1987a), and Auerbach, Kotlikoff (1987b). 
Feldstein (1978), showed that elimination of tax on capital income is only optimal only  when the 
structure of preferences satisfy certain separability condition. And for the capital taxation to be 
optimal it must be that uncompensated elasticity of savings (elasticity of the Marshalian demand for 
savings) is zero, even when the compensated elasticity of consumption of old population (Hicksian 
demand for consumption) is high (he reported result of -0.75). Now, if the labor and consumption are 
equivalent for the individuals, but savings pattern are different, results is that individuals will save 
more with consumption tax, than with labor tax. In OLG closed economy capital stock is due to life-
time savings. The full neutrality result implies extra savings of young is equal to the consumption of 
old capital stock plus new government deficit (no change in capital stock)4.In equilibrium where 
endowment is zero at equilibrium, and Hicksian demand for consumption is infinite i.e. compensated 
elasticity of consumption when old is infinite. But according to Saez,Stantcheva (2016a), because 
individuals derive utility from wealth, micro foundations for this wealth in the utility function are : 
bequest motives, entrepreneurship, or services from wealth it means that steady-state features finite 
finite supply elasticities of capital to capital tax rates. And because there is bi-heterogeneity of the 
agent’s income and capital, Atkinson-Stiglitz zero-tax result does not apply herein. The optimal tax 
rate on inheritance (bequest in utility) case is zero, when the elasticity of bequest is infinite nesting 
the zero tax result. However, when in the model are imputed bequests, inequality is bi-dimensional 
and earnings are no longer the unique determinant of lifetime resources. That means that here A-S 
zero-tax result fails, see Piketty, T. , Saez,E., (2013), Farhi and Werning (2010).Also, Stiglitz, J.(1982) , 
showed that when leisure and goods are separable, differential taxation of commodities cannot be 
used as a basis of separation between the two and therefore is sub-optimal, Saez (2002). Commodity 
taxation is desirable when government is using social weights that are correlated with the 
 
4 Aggregate interest rate should equal to interest rate for the government debt.  
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consumption patterns and are conditional on income, or when the consumption patterns are related 
to the intrinsic earning ability and leisure choices5. Saez, E. ,S. Stantcheva (2016b),define social 
marginal welfare weight as a function of agents  consumption, earnings, and a set of characteristics 
that affect social marginal welfare weight and a set of characteristics that affect utility. Chari and 
Kehoe(1999), besides developing stronger zero-optimal capital income tax rate than Chamley (1986), 
are developing Barro’s (1979) result on tax smoothing, where in deterministic concept, optimal tax 
rates are constant, while in stochastic economy with incomplete markets tax rates follow a random 
pattern generated by a martingale process6. Auerbach, A. (2009), Kaplow(1994), propose equivalence 
of consumption taxes and labor taxes: a linear consumption at some inclusive rate, is equivalent to a 
labor tax income combined with the initial wealth.  In this setting consumption tax is equal to labor 
tax if there is no initial wealth and differences in wealth arise only from wealth preferences.  
Optimal taxation models: Mirrlees (1971)  
In the Mirrlees (1971) model, all individuals have same utility function which depends positively on 
consumption, and negatively on labor supply  ,which can be denoted as 𝑢(𝑐, 𝑙). Let’s suppose the 
utility function g the agents in the economy  Mirrlees (1971) model: 
Equation 1 
𝑈(𝑐, 𝑙) = 𝑐 −
𝑙2
2
 
Where  𝑦 = 𝜃𝑙 и 𝜃 represents the level of skils of the worker. Now his social welfare function SWF is  
:𝑆𝑊𝐹(𝑣) = log(𝑣).Now lets find the distribution of skills when  𝑇(𝑦) = 0.3 which is Pareto with 
ℎ(𝑦) = 𝑘𝑦−𝑘−1𝑦𝑘7.Equation for the distribution of skills is 𝑓(𝜃) = ℎ(𝑦(𝜃))𝑦′(𝜃),from the quasi-
linear utility functions : 𝑈(𝑐, 𝑦, 𝜃) = 𝑐 −
1
2
(
𝑦
𝜃
)
2
.And the tax function 𝑇(𝑦) = 𝜏𝑦, individual with skill 
level 𝜃 solves : 
Equation 2 
max
𝑦
(1 − 𝜏)𝑦 −
1
2
(
𝑦
𝜃
)
2
 
FOC is given as :(1 − 𝜏) −
𝑦
𝜃2
= 0, which implies that 𝑦 = (1 − 𝜏)𝜃2 and 𝑓(𝜃) = ℎ(𝑦(𝜃))𝑦′(𝜃) =
𝑘(𝜃)−𝑘−1𝑦𝑘2(1 − 𝜏)𝜃 = 𝑘((1 − 𝜏)𝜃2)
−𝑘−1
𝑦𝑘2(1 − 𝜏)𝜃 = 2𝑘(1 − 𝜏)−𝑘𝜃−2𝑘−1𝑦𝑘 =
2𝑘𝜃−2𝑘−1𝜃𝑙
2𝑘  .By integration one could get  :𝐹(𝜃) = ∫ 𝑓(𝜃)𝑑𝜃 = ∫ 2𝑘(1 − 𝜏)−𝑘𝜃−2𝑘−1𝑦𝑘𝑑𝜃 =
𝜃
𝜃𝑙
𝜃
𝜃𝑙
[−(1 − 𝜏)−𝑘𝜃−2𝑘𝑦𝑘]
𝜃𝑙
𝜃
= (1 − 𝜏)−𝑘𝜃𝑙
−2𝑘−1 ((1 − 𝜏)𝜃𝑙
2)
𝑘
− (1 − 𝜏)−𝑘𝜃−2𝑘𝑦𝑘 = 1 − 𝜃−2𝑘𝜃𝑙
2𝑘.Now 
we can solve for numerical optimum. Let’s use  𝑦 = 2 and 𝑘 = 4  and truncate the distrubition8 at 
the top 𝑥 percentile for some small 𝑥.    
 
5 And if in the presence of optimal income taxation whether if a small commodity tax can be replicated by a 
small income change, and when this is not a case commodity taxation allows government to expand its own 
taxation power and therefore it is desirable.  
6  Martingale is a sequence of random variables (i.e., a stochastic process) for which, at a particular time, the 
conditional expectation of the next value in the sequence, given all prior values, is equal to the present value. 
7 This is a density of earnings function , dependent on the skills of workers  
8 In statistics  truncated distribution is a conditional distribution that comes as a result of the restriction 
of the domain of some other distribution or probability .  
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 In this case : max
𝑣(𝜃),𝑢(𝜃)
∫ 𝑊[𝑣(𝜃)]𝑓(𝜃)𝑑𝜃
𝜃ℎ
𝜃𝑙
.Subject to : 
∫ (𝑦(𝜃) − 𝑒(𝑣(𝜃), 𝑦(𝜃), 𝜃))𝑓(𝜃)𝑑𝜃 ≥ 0; 𝑣′(𝜃) = 𝑢𝜃  [𝑒(𝑣(𝜃), 𝑦(𝜃), 𝜃)]
𝜃ℎ
𝜃𝑙
 
𝑦(𝜃) is non decreasing function. Hamiltonian is formed as  :𝐻 = 𝑊 [𝑣(𝜃)]𝑓(𝜃) + 𝜆 (𝑦(𝜃) −
 𝑒(𝑣(𝜃), 𝑦(𝜃), 𝜃))𝑓(𝜃) + 𝜂 (𝜃)𝑈𝜃  [𝑒(𝑣(𝜃), 𝑦(𝜃), 𝜃), 𝑦(𝜃), 𝜃]. 
Standard conditions are as: 
1. 
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝑦
= 0 ⇒ 𝜆𝑓(1 − 𝑒𝑦) + 𝜂[𝑢𝜃𝑐𝑒𝑦 + 𝑢𝜃𝑦] = 0 
2. 
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝑣
== 𝜂′ ⇒ 𝑊′𝑓 − 𝜆𝑒𝑣𝑓 + 𝜂𝑢𝜃𝑐𝑒𝑣 = −𝜂
′ 
Transfersality conditions : 𝜂(𝜃𝑙) = 𝜂(𝜃
ℎ) = 0 .From  𝑊 = log(𝑣) и  𝑢(𝑐, 𝑦, 𝜃) = 𝑐 − (
1
2
) (
𝑦
𝜃
)
2
 will 
get the following derivatives :𝑢𝜃 =
𝑦2
𝜃3
; 𝑢𝜃𝑐 = 0;  𝑢𝜃𝑦 =
2𝑦
3
 ;  𝑊′ =
1
𝑣
.Let us remember that 𝑣 =
𝑢(𝑒(𝑣, 𝑦, 𝜃), 𝑦, 𝜃),we have 1 = 𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑣 и 0 = 𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑦 + 𝑢𝑦,therefore :𝑒𝑣 =
1
𝑢𝑐
; 𝑒𝑦 = −
𝑢𝑦
𝑢𝑐
=
𝑦
𝜃2
. If we 
substitute in the optimality and control equations about the state variables one can get : 
Equation 3 
𝜆𝑓 (1 −
𝑦
𝜃2
) + 𝜂 [
2𝑦
𝜃3
] = 0 и 
𝑓
𝑣
− 𝜆𝑓 = −𝜂′ 
If we solve in the first equation for 𝑦(𝜃) we get : 𝑦(𝜃) =
𝜆𝑓 (𝜃)𝜃3
𝜆𝑓 (𝜃)𝜃−2𝜂(𝜃)
. With the equation 𝜂′𝜂′(𝜃) =
(𝜆 −
1
𝑣(𝜃)
) 𝑓(𝜃). If we substitute for 𝑦(𝜃) in the constraint :𝑣′(𝜃) = 𝑢𝜃[𝑒(𝑣(𝜃), 𝑦(𝜃), 𝜃), 𝑦, 𝜃] =
𝑦2
𝜃3
=
(
𝜆𝑓 (𝜃)
𝜆𝑓 (𝜃)𝜃−2𝜂(𝜃) 
)
2
𝜃3.In Saez (2001) optimal tax formula is given as : 
Equation 4 
𝜏 =
1 − ?̅?
1 − ?̅? + 𝜀?̅? + 𝜀̅𝑐(𝑎 − 1) 
  
In the previous expression 𝜏 are taxes, ?̅? is the ratio of social marginal utility for the top bracket 
taxpayers to the marginal value of public funds for the government, which depends on the social 
welfare function 9. Utility in the social welfare function provides a guideline for the government for 
achieving optimal distribution of income, Tresch, R. W. (2008) . In the Saez (2001) optimal tax formula 
also: 
equation 5 
  𝜀̅𝑢 = ∫ 𝜀𝑤
𝑢 𝑤ℎ(𝑤)𝑑𝑤/𝑤𝑚
∞
?̅?
 ,  
 
9 Social welfare function can be :𝑆𝑊𝐹 = ∫ 𝑈𝑖 𝑑𝑖-Utilitarian or Benthamite, 𝑆𝑊𝐹 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑈
𝑖- 
Rawlsian 𝑆𝑊𝐹 = ∫ 𝑈𝑖𝑑𝑖 → 𝐺(𝑈) =
𝑈1−𝛾
1−𝛾
 if 𝛾 = 0  function is utilitarian  , Rawlsian if 𝛾 = ∞. With Pareto 
weights: 𝑆𝑊𝐹 = ∫ 𝜇𝑖𝑈
𝑖 𝑑𝑖 where  𝜇𝑖 is exogenous.   
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where Marshallian demand for labor is given as :𝑤 = 𝑤(1 − 𝜏, 𝑅) where 𝑅 is the non-labour 
income, and 𝑤  are earnings(wages)10. And compensated elasticity of earnings is : 
equation 6 
 𝜀̅𝑐 =
1−𝜏
𝑤
(
𝜕𝑤
𝜕(1−𝜏)
) |𝑢 . 
Thоse two are related by the Slutsky equation : 𝜀𝑐 = 𝜀𝑢 − 𝜂, when there are no behavioral 
responses there is only meachnical effect denote by M and 𝑀 = [𝑤𝑚 −  ?̅? ]𝑑𝜏 , where 𝑤𝑚 −  ?̅? 
represents the earnings of the agent above medium population earnings. Behavioral responses are 
equal to : 𝑑𝑤 = −
𝜕𝑤
𝜕(1−𝜏)
𝑑𝜏 +
𝜕𝑤
𝜕𝑅
𝑑𝑅 = − (𝜀𝑢𝑤 −
(1−𝜏)𝜕𝑤
𝜕𝑅
) (
𝑑𝜏
1−𝜏
) ,or the total behavioral response 
𝛽 = − (𝜀𝑢𝑤
(1−𝜏)𝜕𝑤
𝜕𝑅
) (
𝜏𝑑𝜏
1−𝜏
).Saez(2001) result for high income earners is given as : 
equation 7 
 
𝜏
1−𝜏
=
(1−?̅?) (𝑤𝑚/(?̅?−1)
?̅?𝑢𝑤𝑚
?̅?−∫ 𝜂𝑤ℎ(𝑤)𝑑𝑤 
∞
?̅?
. 
 In the Mirrlees(1971)  model government , maximizes11 : 
equation 8 
𝑆𝑊𝐹 = ∫ 𝐺(𝑢𝑤)𝑓(𝑤)𝑑𝑤
∞
0
.  
In the previous expression 𝐺(𝑢𝑤) represents the concave utility function
12.The constraint here is given 
as: ∫ 𝐺(𝑢𝑤)𝑓(𝑤)𝑑𝑤 ≦ ∫ 𝑤𝑙𝑓(𝑤)𝑑𝑤 − 𝐸 
∞
0
 
∞
0
,where 𝐸 are government expenditures. Now, about 
Pareto distributions it is well known fact that :
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑
= 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 .Now if we denote the average 
wage  𝑤∗(𝑤) > 𝑤, and if 𝑤 is a threshold, then 𝑤∗(𝑤) can be expressed as : 
equation 9 
𝑤∗(𝑤) = ∫ 𝑤𝑓(𝑤)𝑑𝑤/ ∫ 𝑓(𝑤)𝑑𝑤 = ∫ 𝑑𝑤/𝑤𝑎
𝑤𝑚>𝑤
/ ∫ 𝑑𝑤/𝑤1+𝑎 =
𝑎𝑤
𝑎 − 1𝑤𝑚>𝑤𝑤𝑚>𝑤 𝑤𝑚>𝑤
 
In the previous expression 𝑎 represents the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution. And 𝑎 =
𝑏
𝑏−1
 
i.e. 
𝑤∗(𝑤)
𝑤
= 𝑏 .About the Pareto distribution PDF of this distribution is given as :1 − 𝐹(𝑤) = (
𝑘
𝑤
)
𝑎
 ,and 
CDF of the function is given as 𝑓(𝑤) =
𝑎𝑘𝑎
𝑤1+𝑎
,13that is lim
𝑤→∞
(
𝑘
𝑤
)
𝑎
𝑤∙(
𝑎𝑘𝑎
𝑤1+𝑎
)
 by applying lim
𝑥→𝑎
[𝑐 ∙ 𝑓(𝑥)] = 𝑐 ∙
lim
𝑥→𝑎
𝑓(𝑥) ⇒
1
𝑎𝑘𝑎
∙ lim
𝑤→∞
(
𝑘
𝑤
)
𝑎
𝑤∙(
𝑎𝑘𝑎
𝑤1+𝑎
)
=
1
𝑎𝑘𝑎
∙ lim
𝑤→∞
(𝑘𝑎) =
1
𝑎𝑘𝑎
∙ 𝑘𝑎 =
1
𝑎
 ,hence the formula of marginal 
 
10 Income effects are captured through 𝜂 = (1 − 𝜏)𝜕𝑤/𝜕𝑅  ,average income effects are :?̅? = ∫ 𝜂𝑤ℎ(𝑤)𝑑𝑤 
∞
?̅?
 
11 Here we make assumption that wages =skill level  
12 Now, for a concave function 𝑓: (𝑎, 𝑏) → 𝑅 is continuous in 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐴. This function 𝑓: (𝑎, 𝑏) → 𝑅 is concave in 
the interval (𝑎, 𝑏) , if for every 𝑥1, 𝑥2 ∈ (𝑎, 𝑏), 𝑎 ∈ (0,1), it follows 𝑓(𝑎𝑥1 + (1 − 𝑎)𝑥2) < 𝑎𝑓(𝑥1) +
(1 − 𝑎)𝑓(𝑥2). 
13 
(
𝑘
𝑤
)
𝑎
𝑤∙(
𝑎𝑘𝑎
𝑤1+𝑎
)
=
𝑘𝑎
𝑤𝑎
𝑤∙(
𝑎𝑘𝑎
𝑤1+𝑎
)
=
𝑘𝑎
𝑤𝑎
𝑤∙
𝑎𝑘𝑎
𝑤∙𝑤𝑎
=
1
𝑎
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income for top earners 𝜏∗ =
1
1+𝑎∙𝜀
.This is the tax rate that maximizes government revenues. The 
optimal tax government formula with Rawlsian government 14would be : 
Equation 10 
𝑇′(𝑤(ℎ))
1−𝑇′(𝑤(ℎ))
= (
1+𝜀
𝜀
)
1−𝐹(𝑤)
𝑤𝑓(𝑤)
   or 
𝑇′(𝑤(ℎ))
1−𝑇′(𝑤(ℎ))
= (
1+𝜀
𝜀
)
𝜓(𝑤)−𝐹(𝑤)
𝑤𝑓(𝑤)
 
Now if we divide and multiply by 1 − 𝐹(𝑤) we get : 
equation 11 
𝑇′(𝑤(ℎ))
1−𝑇′(𝑤(ℎ))
= (
1+𝜀
𝜀
)
Ψ(𝑤)−𝐹(𝑤)
1−𝐹(𝑤)
1−𝐹(𝑤)
𝑤𝑓(𝑤)
 . 
In the previous formula (
1+𝜀
𝜀
) = 𝐴(𝑤) , elasticity and efficiency argument, 
Ψ(𝑤)−𝐹(𝑤)
1−𝐹(𝑤)
= 𝐵(𝑤), 
measures the desire for redistribution :if the sum of weights 𝜓(𝑤)𝑓(𝑤) is below 𝑤 is relative high to 
the weights above , the government will like to tax more, this part 
1−𝐹(𝑤)
𝑤𝑓(𝑤)
= 𝐶(𝑤) measures the 
density of the right tail of the distribution and higher density will be associated with higher taxes. In 
Piketty, T., Saez.E., and Stantcheva,S.(2014), it is well defined aggregate elasticity of income as: 
 𝜀 =
1−𝜏
𝑧
𝑑𝑧
𝑑(1−𝜏)
  , where 𝑧  is taxable income and 𝑧 = 𝑦 − 𝑥, where 𝑦 is the real income, and 𝑥 is 
sheltered income 15,taxable income s used in the calculation for Pareto parameter 𝑎 =
𝑧
𝑧−?̅?
. Tax 
avoidance elasticity component is given as 𝜀1 =
1−𝜏
𝑧
𝑑𝑥
1−𝜏
 , and 𝜀2 =
1−𝜏
𝑧
𝑑𝑦
1−𝜏
 is the real labor supply 
elasticity. Now, when government raises slightly 𝜏 → 𝑑𝜏 there is:  
1. mechanical effect from the increase in taxes i.e. 𝑑𝑀 = ( 𝑧 − 𝑧∗)𝑑𝜏 ,  
2. welfare effect 𝑑𝑊 = −?̅?𝑑𝑀 = −?̅?( 𝑧 − 𝑧∗)𝑑𝜏 , where social marginal weight for individual 
is :𝑔𝑖 = 𝐺
′(𝑢𝑖)𝑢𝑐
𝑖 /𝜆 , where 𝜆 is a multiplier of government constraint which is 
∫ 𝜏(𝑤𝑙)𝑓(𝑤)𝑑𝑤 ≥ 𝐸 ,average income in economy is 𝑧̅ = ∫ 𝑧ℎ(𝑧)𝑑𝑧, ℎ(𝑧) is a density 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝜏(𝑧)
= 𝜆, 𝑐 = 𝑧̅ − 𝐸, while ?̅? social marginal weight for top earners is given as:           ?̅? =
 
∫ 𝑔𝑖∙𝑧𝑖
𝑧∗∙∫ 𝑔𝑖
  , where 𝑧 − 𝑧∗ is the mechanical redistribution effect.  
3. And, the third effect is behavioral response of the top earners: 𝑑𝐵 = −
𝜏
1−𝜏
∙
1−𝜏
𝑧
∙
𝑑𝑧
𝑑(1−𝜏)
∙ 𝑧 ∙
𝑑𝜏  = −
𝜏
1−𝜏
∙ 𝜀 ∙ 𝑧 ∙ 𝑑𝜏 . 
From here it can be derived Diamond (1998) optimal tax formula : 
equation 12 
𝜏(𝑧)
1−𝜏(𝑧)
=
1
𝜀(𝑧)
∙ [
1−𝐹(𝑧)
𝑧∙𝐹(𝑧)
] ∙ [1 − 𝐺(𝑧)],  
 
14 The social welfare function that uses as its measure of social welfare the utility of the worst-off member of 
society. The following argument can be used to motivate the Rawlsian social welfare function. 
15 Investments or investment accounts that provide favorable tax treatment , or activities and transactions that 
lower taxable income.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3531287
this is distribution shape parameter 
1−𝐹(𝑧)
𝑧∙𝐹(𝑧)
 , 𝐺(𝑧) are social marginal welfare weights For numerical 
solutions of the Mirrless model (1971) , one can look up to Brewer, M., E. Saez, and A. Shephard 
(2010) ,  
Equation 13 
𝜏′𝑧(ℎ)
1 − 𝜏′𝑧(ℎ)
= (1 +
1
𝜀
)
1
ℎ𝑓(ℎ)
∫ (1 −
𝐺′𝑢(ℎ)
𝜆
) 𝑓(ℎ)𝑑ℎ
∞
ℎ
 
Where 𝜆 = ∫ 𝐺′(𝑢)𝑑ℎ.Few general conclusions about marginal tax rates in the literature appear: 
1. 𝜏(𝑧(ℎ)) ≥ 0 , a in Mirrlees (1971),  
2. 𝜏(𝑧(ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡 ℎ)) = 0 (𝑓(ℎ)bounded above ,Sadka, (1976),  
3. 𝜏(𝑧(𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 ℎ)) = 0 (ℎ: 𝑦(ℎ) > 0),Seade,(1977). 
 
The effect of small tax reform in MIrrless (1971) model is examined in Brewer, M., E. Saez, and A. 
Shephard (2010) ,where indirect utility function is given as :𝑈(1 − 𝜏, 𝑅) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑧((1 − 𝜏)𝑧 + 𝑅, 𝑧) 
,where 𝑧  represents the taxable income 𝑅 is a virtual income intercept, and 𝜏 is an imposed income 
tax. Marshalian labor supply is :𝑧 = 𝑧(1 − 𝜏, 𝑅), uncompensated elasticity of the supply is given 
as:𝜀𝑢 =
(1−𝜏)
𝑧
𝜕𝑧
𝜕(1−𝜏)
 , income effect is 𝜂 = (1 − 𝜏)
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝑅
≤ 0.Hicksian supply of labor is given 
as:𝑧𝑐((1 − 𝜏, 𝑢)), this minimizes the cost in need to achieve slope 1 − 𝜏 , compensated elasticity now 
is : 𝜀𝑐 =
(1−𝜏)
𝑧
𝜕𝑧𝑐
𝜕(1−𝜏)
> 0, Slutsky equation now becomes: 
𝜕𝑧
𝜕(1−𝜏)
=
𝜕𝑧𝑐
𝜕(1−𝜏)
+ 𝑧
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝑅
⇒ 𝜀𝑢 = 𝜀𝑐 + 𝜂, 
where 𝜂 represents income effect :𝜂 = (1 − 𝜏)
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝑅
≤ 0 .With small tax reform taxes and revenue 
change i.e.:𝑑𝑈 = 𝑢𝑐 ∙ [−𝑧𝑑𝑡 + 𝑑𝑅] + 𝑑𝑧[(1 − 𝜏)𝑢𝑐 + 𝑢𝑧] = 𝑢𝑐 ∙ [−𝑧𝑑𝑡 + 𝑑𝑅].Change of taxes and 
its impact on the society is given as:𝑑𝑈𝑖 = −𝑢𝑐𝑑𝑇(𝑧𝑖). Envelope theorem here says :𝑈(𝜃) =
max
𝑥
𝐹(𝑥, 𝜃), 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑐 > 𝐺(𝑥, 𝜃)  , and the preliminary result is :𝑈′(𝜃) =
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝜃
(𝑥∗(𝜃), 𝜃 −
𝜆∗(𝜃)
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝜃
𝑥∗(𝜃), 𝜃). Government is maximizing :0 = ∫ 𝐺′(𝑢𝑖)𝑢𝑐
𝑖 ∙ [(𝑍 − 𝑧𝑖) −
𝜏
𝑑(1−𝜏)
𝑒𝑍], mechanical 
effect is given as:𝑑𝑀 = [𝑧 − 𝑧∗]𝑑𝜏, welfare effect is :𝑑𝑊 = −?̅?𝑑𝑀 = −?̅?[𝑧 − 𝑧∗], and at last the 
behavioral response is :𝑑𝐵 = −
𝜏
1−𝜏
∙ 𝑒 ∙ 𝑧𝑑𝜏. And lets denote that:  
Equation 14 
𝑑𝑀 + 𝑑𝑊 + 𝑑𝐵 = 𝑑𝜏 [1 − ?̅?[𝑧 − 𝑧∗] − 𝑒
𝜏
1 − 𝜏
∙ 𝑧] 
When the tax is optimal these three effects should equal zero i.e. 𝑑𝑀 + 𝑑𝑊 + 𝑑𝐵 = 0 given 
that:
𝜏
1−𝜏
=
(1−?̅?)[𝑧−𝑧∗]
𝑒∙𝑧
 , and we got 𝜏 =
1−?̅?
1−?̅?+𝑎∙𝑒
, 𝑎 =
𝑧
𝑧−𝑧∗
,and 𝑑𝑀 = 𝑑𝜏[𝑧 − 𝑧∗] ≪ 𝑑𝐵 = 𝑑𝜏 ∙ 𝑒
𝜏
1−𝜏
∙
𝑧, кога 𝑧∗ > 𝑧𝑇  , where 𝑧𝑇  is a top earner income. Pareto distribution is given as: 
Equation 15 
1 − 𝐹(𝑧) = (
𝑘
𝑧
)
𝑎
, 𝑓(𝑧) = 𝑎 ∙
𝑘𝑎
𝑧1+𝑎
 
𝑎 is a thickness parameter and top income distribution is measured as: 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3531287
Equation 16 
𝑧(𝑧∗) =
∫ 𝑠𝑓(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
∞
𝑧∗
∫ 𝑓(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
∞
𝑧∗
=
∫ 𝑠−𝑎𝑑𝑠
∞
𝑧∗
∫ 𝑠−𝑎−1𝑑𝑠
∞
𝑧∗
=
𝑎
(𝑎 − 1)
∙ 𝑧∗ 
Empirically  𝑎 ∈ [1.5,3], 𝜏 =
1−?̅?
1−?̅?+𝑎∙𝑒
.General non-linear tax without income effects is given as: 
Equation 17 
𝑇′(𝑧𝑛)
1 − 𝑇′(𝑧𝑛)
=
1
𝑒
(
∫ (1 − 𝑔𝑚)𝑑𝐹(𝑚)
∞
𝑛
𝑧𝑛ℎ(𝑧𝑛)
) =
1
𝑒
(
1 − 𝐻(𝑧𝑛)
𝑧𝑛ℎ(𝑧𝑛)
) ∙ (1 − 𝐺((𝑧𝑛)) 
Where 𝐺((𝑧𝑛) =
∫ 𝑔𝑚𝑑𝐹(𝑚)
∞
𝑛
1−𝐹(𝑛)
 ,and 𝑔𝑚 = 𝐺′(𝑢𝑚)/𝑝 this is welfare weight of type 𝑚.But non-linear tax 
witn income effect takes into account small tax reform where tax rates change from 𝑑𝜏 to 
[𝑧∗ , 𝑧∗ + 𝑑𝑧∗].Every tax payer with income  𝑧 above 𝑧∗ pays additionaly  𝑑𝜏𝑑𝑧∗ valued by 
(1 − 𝑔(𝑧))𝑑𝜏𝑑𝑧∗.Mechanical effect is : 
Equation 18 
𝑀 = 𝑑𝜏𝑑𝑧∗ ∫ (1 − 𝑔(𝑧))𝑑𝜏𝑑𝑧∗
∞
𝑧∗
 
Total income response is :𝐼 = 𝑑𝜏𝑑𝑧∗ ∫ (−𝜂𝑍
𝑇′(𝑧)
1−𝑇′(𝑧)
(𝑧)) ℎ(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
∞
𝑧∗
 . Change at the taxpayers form the 
additional tax is :𝑑𝑧 = −𝜀(𝑧)
𝑐 𝑇
′′𝑑𝑧
1−𝑇′
− 𝜂
𝑑𝜏𝑑𝑧∗
1−𝑇′(𝑧)
⇒ −𝜂
𝑑𝜏𝑑𝑧∗
1−𝑇′(𝑧)+𝑧𝜀(𝑧)
𝑐 𝑇′′(𝑧)
, if one sums up all effects can be 
obtained: 
Equation 19 
𝑇′(𝑧)
1 − 𝑇′(𝑧)
=
1
𝜀(𝑧)
𝑐 (
1 − 𝐻(𝑧∗)
𝑧∗ℎ(𝑧∗)
) × [∫ (1 − 𝑔(𝑧))
ℎ(𝑧)
1 − 𝐻(𝑧∗)
𝑑𝑧 + ∫ −𝜂
𝑇′(𝑧)
1 − 𝑇′(𝑧)
ℎ∗(𝑧)
1 − 𝐻(𝑧∗)
𝑑𝑧
∞
𝑧∗
∞
𝑧∗
] 
With linear tax: 
?̇?𝑛
𝑧𝑛
=
1+𝜀(𝑛)
𝑢
𝑛
  and with non-linear tax: 
 
Equation 20 
?̇?𝑛
𝑧𝑛
=
1 + 𝜀(𝑛)
𝑢
𝑛
− ?̇?𝑛
𝑇′′(𝑧𝑛)
1 − 𝑇′′(𝑧𝑛)
𝜀𝑧(𝑛)
𝑐  
This model was later augmented with the migrations by Mirrless (1982).Migrations are of importance 
for the top incomes(brain drain). In the model earnings are fixed 𝑐 , and 𝑝(𝑐|𝑧) represents the number 
of residents earning 𝑧, while 𝑐 = 𝑧 − 𝑇(𝑧) represents the disposable income. Now , one small tax 
reform 𝑑𝑇(𝑧) ,for those earning income 𝑧. Mechanical effect of net-welfare is : 𝑀 + 𝑊 =
(1 − 𝑔(𝑧))𝑃(𝑐|𝑧)𝑑𝑇 .Migration equal taxes average or total:𝑀 + 𝑊 =
𝜕𝑃(𝑐|𝑧)
𝜕𝐶
𝑧−𝑇(𝑧)
𝑃(𝑐|𝑧)
 .Cost of imposing 
taxes are :𝐵 = −
𝑇(𝑧)
𝑧−𝑇(𝑧)
 .Optimal tax applies when : 𝑀 + 𝑊 + 𝐵 = 0.And the formula for the optimal 
tax with migrations becomes : 
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Equation 21 
𝑇(𝑧)
𝑧 − 𝑇(𝑧)
1
𝜂𝑚(𝑧)
∙ (1 − 𝑔(𝑧)) 
𝜂𝑚(𝑧) (elasticity of taxable top income) depends on the size of jurisdiction; it’s large for the cities, and 
its small (zero) for the world, redistribution is easier in larger jurisdictions. Formula for maximizing the 
revenues from top incomes is : 
Equation 22 
𝜏 =
1
1 + 𝑎 ∙ 𝑒 + ?̅?𝑚
 
Where ?̅?𝑚   is elasticity of the top earners towards disposable income. 
 
Diamond-Mirrlees efficiency theorem Diamond-Mirrlees (1971a), Diamond-Mirrlees (1971b) 
 
Setup of the model here is: 𝑝-producer prices , 𝑞-consumer prices , 𝑡 = 𝑞 − 𝑝 taxes  
1. 𝑥ℎ(𝑞)-net demand by consumer ℎ (incomes are equal to zero) ℎ = 1,2 … . , 𝐻   
2. 𝑢ℎ( 𝑥ℎ) utility function of consumer ℎ  
3. 𝑣ℎ(𝑞) indirect utility function 𝑣ℎ(𝑞) = 𝑢ℎ ( 𝑥ℎ(𝑞)) 
4. 𝑋(𝑞) = ∑ 𝑥ℎ (𝑞)ℎ  aggregate net demand  
5. 𝑈(𝑥1 , … . , 𝑥𝐻) social welfare function  
6. 𝑉(𝑞) = 𝑈(𝑥1(𝑞), … . . , 𝑥𝐻(𝑞))  indirect utility function  
7. 𝑊(𝑢1(𝑥1), … . . , 𝑢𝐻(𝑥𝐻)) special case of an individualistic social welfare function  
The aim here is to Maximize 𝑉(𝑞) 
s.t. 𝐺(𝑋(𝑞)) ≦ 0  
where 𝐺 aggregate production constraint  
equation 23 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑞𝑘
= 𝜆∑𝑝𝑖
𝜕𝑋𝑖
𝜕𝑞𝑘
= −𝜆
𝜕
𝜕𝑡𝑘
(∑𝑡𝑖𝑋𝑖)   𝑘 = 2, … . 𝑛 
equation 24 
∑ [
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑞𝑘
− 𝜆∑𝑝𝑖
𝜕𝑋𝑖
𝜕𝑞𝑘
] 𝑞𝑘 = 0
𝑛
𝑘=1
 
Optimal tax structure for one consumer economy is presented as: 
Slutsky equation is given as: 
equation 25 
 𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑞𝑘
= 𝑠𝑖𝑘 − 𝑥𝑘
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝐼 
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𝑠𝑖𝑘 -derivative of compensated curve for 𝑖 with respect to 𝑞𝑘 and 
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝐼 
 is the derivative of the 
uncompensated demand curve  
equation 26 
−𝛼𝑥𝑘 = −𝜆
𝜕
𝜕𝑡𝑘
(∑𝑡𝑖𝑋𝑖) = −𝜆 (𝑥𝑘 + ∑𝑡𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑘
) = −𝜆𝑥𝑘 − 𝜆∑𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑘 + 𝜆𝑥𝑘 + ∑𝑡𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝐼 
  
𝑘 = 1,2, … . . 𝑛 
equation 27 
∑ 𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑖
𝑥𝑖
=
𝛼+𝜆−𝜆∑𝑡𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝐼 
𝜆
     ;       
∑ 𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑖
𝑥𝑖
= −𝜃 
equation 28 
𝜃 ∑ 𝑡𝑘𝑥𝑘 = − ∑ 𝑡𝑘𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑖 ≥ 0
𝑘,𝑖𝑘
 
equation 29 
𝛥𝑥𝑘 = ∑ ∫
𝜕𝑥𝑘
𝜕𝑡𝑖
𝑑𝑡𝑖
𝑡𝑖
0
= ∑ ∫ 𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑑𝑡𝑖 = ∑ 𝑠𝑘𝑖 ∫ 𝑑𝑡𝑖 = ∑ 𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑖
𝑖
𝑡𝑖
0𝑖
  
𝑡𝑖
0𝑖𝑖
 
equation 30 
∑
𝜕𝑥𝑘
𝜕𝑡𝑖
𝑡𝑖 +
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝐼 
𝑖
∑ 𝑡𝑖𝑥𝑖 = −𝜃𝑥𝑘 
equation 31 
∑
𝜕𝑥𝑘
𝜕𝑡𝑖
𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝑥𝑘
= 𝜃 − 𝑥𝑘
−1
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝐼 
∑ 𝑡𝑖𝑥𝑖  
Optimal tax formula is given as: 
equation 32 
𝑞𝑘𝑥𝑘 = ∑[𝑏𝑘𝜔𝑗𝑞𝑗 − 𝑏𝑗𝜔𝑘𝑞𝑘]
𝑗
 
equation 33 
−𝛼𝑞𝑘𝑥𝑘 = 𝜆 [∑ 𝑏𝑗
𝑝𝑗
𝑞𝑗
𝜔𝑘𝑞𝑘 − 𝑏𝑘
 𝑝𝑘
𝑞𝑘
∑ 𝜔𝑗𝑞𝑗
𝑗≠𝑘𝑗≠𝑘
] = 𝜆 ∑ [𝑏𝑗𝜔𝑘
𝑝𝑗𝑞𝑘
𝑞𝑗
− 𝑏𝑘𝜔𝑗
𝑝𝑘𝑞𝑗
𝑞𝑘
]
𝑗
 
∑𝑏𝑗 = 1  
equation 34 
∑ [𝑏𝑗𝜔𝑘𝑞𝑘 (
𝑝𝑗
𝑞𝑗
−
𝛼
𝜆
) − 𝑏𝑘𝜔𝑗𝑞𝑗 (
𝑝𝑘
𝑞𝑘
−
𝛼
𝜆
)] = 0
𝑗
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Optimal taxation many consumer economy is given as: 
equation 35 
𝑉(𝑞) = 𝑊(𝑣1(𝑞), … . . , 𝑣𝐻(𝑞)) 
Differentiating with respect to 𝑞𝑘 we have : 
 
equation 36 
𝑉𝑘 = ∑
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝑢ℎ
 ℎ 𝑣𝑘
ℎ = − ∑
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝑢ℎ
𝛼ℎ𝑥𝑘
ℎ  ℎ    
𝛼ℎ-marginal utility of income  
𝛽ℎ =
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝑢ℎ
𝛼ℎ increase in social welfare form an increase in the income of consumer h  
equation 37 
−𝑉𝑘 = ∑ 𝛽
ℎ𝑥𝑘
ℎ
ℎ
 
equation 38 
∑ 𝛽ℎ𝑥𝑘
ℎ
ℎ
= 𝜆
𝜕𝑇 
𝜕𝑡𝑘
 
𝑇 = ∑𝑡𝑖𝑋𝑖 -total revenue from taxes  
equation 39 
∑ 𝛽ℎ𝑥𝑘
ℎ
ℎ
= −𝜆 ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝜕𝑋𝑖
𝜕𝑞𝑘
𝑖
 
In a Cobb-Douglas production function case we have : 
equation 40 
𝑢ℎ = 𝑏1
ℎ𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑥1
ℎ + 𝜔ℎ) + ∑ 𝑏𝑖
ℎ
𝑛
2
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑥𝑖
ℎ ;  ∑𝑏𝑖 = 1  
Where 𝑥𝑖
ℎ = 𝑞1
−1𝑏𝑖
ℎ𝑞1𝜔
ℎ; 𝑖 = 1,2,3 … , 𝑛 ; 𝑥1
ℎ = −(1 − 𝑏1
ℎ)𝜔ℎ 
equation 41 
𝜕𝑥𝑖
ℎ
𝜕𝑞𝑘
= 0; 𝑘 ≠ 𝑖 ≠ 1        
𝜕𝑥𝑖
ℎ
𝜕𝑞𝑖
= −
𝑥𝑖
ℎ
𝑞𝑖
 
equation 42 
∑ 𝛽ℎ𝑥𝑘
ℎ
ℎ = 𝜆𝑝𝑘𝑞𝑘
−1 ∑ 𝑥𝑘
ℎ
ℎ   𝑘 = 2, … 𝑛 
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equation 43 
𝑞𝑘
𝑝𝑘
= 𝜆
∑ 𝑥𝑘
ℎ
ℎ
∑ 𝛽ℎ𝑥𝑘
ℎ
ℎ
= 𝜆
𝑏𝑘
ℎ𝑞1𝜔
ℎ
𝛽ℎ𝑏𝑘
ℎ𝜔ℎ
;  𝑘 = 2, … 𝑛 
 
equation 44 
−𝑝𝑖 ∑(1 − 𝑏1
ℎ)𝜔ℎ + ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖
−1𝑏𝑖
ℎ𝑞1𝜔
ℎ = 𝛾
ℎ
𝑛
𝑖=2ℎ
 
 
𝛾 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑧𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  -maximized profit of production of net government needs  
 
equation 45 
 
𝑞1
𝑝1
= 𝜆
∑ (1−𝑏1
ℎ)𝜔ℎ+𝛾𝑝1
−1
ℎ
∑ ∑ 𝛽ℎ𝑏𝑖
ℎ𝜔ℎℎ
𝑛
𝑖=2
= 𝜆
∑ (1−𝑏1
ℎ)𝜔ℎ+𝛾𝑝1
−1
ℎ
∑ ∑ 𝛽ℎ(1−𝑏1
ℎ)𝜔ℎℎ
𝑛
𝑖=2
 
 
𝛾𝑝1
−1 -depends on government expenditure decision and technology  
Optimum taxes have to satisfy  
equation 46 
𝑞𝑘
𝑝𝑘
∑ 𝑏𝑘
ℎ(𝜔ℎ)
−𝜇
Π𝑖=2
𝑛 (𝑏𝑖
ℎ)
𝜇𝑏𝑖
ℎ
𝑞𝜇𝑏𝑖
ℎ
ℎ
= 𝜆 ∑ 𝑏𝑘
ℎ𝜔ℎ  (𝑘 = 2,3, … 𝑛)
ℎ
 
equation 47 
𝑊 = −𝜇−1 ∑ 𝑒−(𝜇𝑣
ℎ)
ℎ
 
Optimal tax formulae here is : 
equation 48 
∑ 𝛽ℎ𝑥𝑘
ℎ = 𝜆 ∑ ∑ 𝑡𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
ℎ
𝜕𝑞𝑘
+ 𝜆 ∑ 𝑥𝑘
ℎ
ℎ𝑖ℎℎ
 
 
equation 49 
 𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑞𝑘
= 𝑠𝑖𝑘 − 𝑥𝑘
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝐼 
  Slutsky equation  
equation 50 
 𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑞𝑘
= 𝑠𝑖𝑘 − 𝑥𝑘
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝐼 
= 𝑠𝑘𝑖 − 𝑥𝑘
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝐼 
=
𝜕𝑥𝑘
𝜕𝑞𝑖
− 𝑥𝑘
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝐼 
+ 𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑘
𝜕𝑞𝑖
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Next Diamond-Mirrlees theorem is put against efficiency.On the Consumption side 
𝑧 = 𝑧1, 𝑧2 … . 𝑧𝑛   the vector of government supply Government  
s.t.  𝐺(𝑧) ≦ 0 ′𝑧 ≦ 𝑔(𝑧2, 𝑧3, … . , 𝑧𝑛) 
𝑥(𝑞) = 𝑧  consumer demands 𝑥 = (𝑥1, … . , 𝑥𝑛) and prices faced by the consumers 𝑞 = (𝑞1, … , 𝑞𝑛)  
max 𝑣(𝑞)  objective function s.t. 𝐺(𝑥(𝑞))  ≦ 0 
𝑣(𝑞) = 𝑢(𝑥(𝑞))  𝑣𝑘 = 𝜕𝑣/𝜕𝑞𝑘 ; 𝑢𝑖 = 𝜕𝑢/𝜕𝑥𝑖 
𝑣𝑘 = ∑𝑢𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑞𝑘
= −𝛼𝑥𝑘  s.t. budget constraint ∑𝑞𝑖𝑥𝑖 = 0 
𝑥𝑘 + ∑𝑞𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑞𝑘
= 0  utility maximization implies 𝑢 = 𝛼𝑞𝑖  
On the Production side: 
𝑝 = (𝑝1, … , 𝑝𝑛)  producers prices   they differ form prices faced by the consumers 
 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖 + 𝑡  ;  𝑦 = 𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑛  vector of privately supplied commodities  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑦2, . . 𝑦𝑛) equality on the production constraint  
𝑝𝑖 = −𝑝1𝑓1(𝑦2, … . , 𝑦𝑛) 
Constant returns to scale maximized profits are zero in equilibrium : ∑𝑝𝑖𝑦𝑖 = 0  
𝑧 = 𝑔(𝑧2 , 𝑧3, … . , 𝑧𝑛) government constrain satisfied with equality  
Walras’ law implies that: 
𝑥(𝑞) = 𝑦 + 𝑧 all markets clear ,Walras’ law implies that if all agents satisfy their budget constraint 
and all markets but one are in equilibrium then the last market is also in equilibrium. 
∑(𝑞𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖)𝑥𝑖 + ∑𝑝𝑖𝑧𝑖 = 0 = ∑𝑡𝑖𝑥𝑖 + ∑𝑝𝑖𝑧𝑖  in normalization 𝑝𝑖 = 1 ; 𝑞𝑖 = 1 ; 𝑡 = 0  
Thus levying a positive tax 𝑡 > 0  on consumer transactions is in fact subsidy and results in loss of 
revenues by the government.  
Welfare maximization requires that : 
𝑦2 = 𝑥2 − 𝑧2; … ; 𝑦𝑛 = 𝑥𝑛 − 𝑧𝑛; s.t. 𝑥1(𝑞) = 𝑦1 + 𝑧1 = 𝑓(𝑥2 − 𝑧2, … , 𝑥𝑛 − 𝑧𝑛)   
max 𝑣(𝑞)  s.t. 𝑥1(𝑞) − 𝑓(𝑥2(𝑞) − 𝑧2 , … . , 𝑥𝑛(𝑞) − 𝑧𝑛 ) − 𝑔(𝑧2 , … , 𝑧𝑛) = 0  
𝐿 = 𝑣(𝑞) − 𝜆[𝑥1(𝑞) − 𝑓(𝑥2 − 𝑧2, … . , 𝑥𝑛 − 𝑧𝑛 ) − 𝑔(𝑧2, … , 𝑧𝑛)] -Lagrangian  
Differentiate with respect to 𝑞𝑘 
𝑣𝑘 − 𝜆 (
𝜕𝑥1
𝜕𝑞𝑘
− ∑ 𝑓𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑞𝑘
𝑛
𝑖=2 ) = 0 𝑘 = 2,3, … , 𝑛  
Differentiating 𝐿 to 𝑧𝑘 we have  
𝜆(𝑓𝑘 − 𝑔𝑘) = 0   𝑘 = 2,3, … , 𝑛 
𝜆 ≠ 0   social cost associated with the marginal need for additional resources (i.e. equality of 
marginal rates of transformation): 
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𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑓𝑘 = 𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑔𝑘  
Optimal tax structure is : 
equation 51 
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑞𝑘
=
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑘
 
𝑣𝑘 = 𝜆∑𝑝𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑘
= 𝜆
𝜕
𝜕𝑡𝑘
∑𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑖 
∑𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑖 = ∑𝑞𝑖𝑥𝑖 − ∑𝑡𝑖𝑥𝑖 = −∑𝑡𝑖𝑥𝑖 
  
𝑣𝑘 = −𝜆
𝜕
𝜕𝑡𝑘
∑𝑡𝑖𝑥𝑖 
𝑥𝑘 =
𝜆
𝛼
𝜕(∑𝑡𝑖𝑥𝑖) 
𝜕𝑡𝑘
 
The ratio of marginal tax revenue from an increase in tax on that commodity is: 
equation 52 
∑ 𝛽ℎ𝑥𝑘
ℎ = 𝜆 ∑ ∑ 𝑡𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑘
ℎ
𝜕𝑞𝑖
+ 𝜆 ∑ ∑ 𝑡𝑖 (𝑥𝑖
ℎ 𝜕𝑥𝑘
ℎ
𝜕𝐼 
− 𝑥𝑘
ℎ
𝜕𝑥𝑖
ℎ
𝜕𝐼
) + 𝜆 ∑ 𝑥𝑘
ℎ
ℎ
 
𝑖ℎ𝑖ℎℎ
 
 
equation 53 
∑ ∑ 𝑡𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
ℎ
𝜕𝑞𝑖𝑖ℎ
∑ 𝑥𝑘
ℎ
ℎ
=
1
𝜆
∑ 𝛽ℎ𝑥𝑘
ℎ
ℎ
∑ 𝑥𝑘
ℎ
ℎ
− 1 +
∑ (∑ 𝑡𝑖𝑖ℎ
𝜕𝑥𝑖
ℎ
𝜕𝐼 )𝑥𝑘
ℎ  
∑ 𝑥𝑘
ℎ
ℎ
−
∑ (∑ 𝑡𝑖𝑖ℎ 𝑥𝑖
ℎ)
𝜕𝑥𝑘
ℎ
𝜕𝐼  
∑ 𝑥𝑘
ℎ
ℎ
 
The ratio of marginal tax revenue from an increase in tax on that commodity to the quantity of the 
commodity is constant. Production efficiency in many consumer economy requires: 
1. 𝐻-households    𝑢ℎ; 𝑥ℎ   ℎ = 1,2, … . , 𝐻   
2. 𝑉(𝑞) = 𝑈(𝑥1(𝑞), 𝑥2(𝑞), … , 𝑥𝑛(𝑞))-objective function  
3. 𝑉(𝑞) = 𝑊 (𝑢1(𝑥1(𝑞)), 𝑢2(𝑥2(𝑞)) , … , 𝑢𝑛(𝑥𝑛(𝑞)))- Welfare function strictly increasing   
4. max 𝑉(𝑞)  s.t. 𝐺(𝑋(𝑞)) ≦ 0 
5. 𝑋(𝑞) = ∑ 𝑥ℎ (𝑞)ℎ     𝐺 represents the production set  
The efficiency argument requires that aggregate production functions 𝑋(𝑞) are continuous then any 
small change in prices 𝑞  will not change aggregate production requirements. Welfare can be written 
with a transfer 𝜏 𝑉(𝑞, 𝜏) s.t. 𝑋(𝑞, 𝜏)being in 𝐺 (𝑞∗, 𝜏∗)  .No commodity taxes are possible but poll tax 
is possible , A poll tax, also known as head tax or capitation, is a tax levied as a fixed sum on every 
liable individual. And part of the productions is privately controlled in such a way that it is uniquely 
determined by producer prices. Maximization here states that: 
equation 54 
max(𝑝, 𝜏)  𝜏 -poll tax or subsidy  
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s.t. 𝑋(𝑝, 𝜏) − 𝑦(𝑝) = 𝑧   
where 𝑦(𝑝) is private production vector and  𝜏 < 𝑡∗ where : 
equation 55 
𝑉(𝑝∗, 𝜏) > 𝑉(𝑝∗, 𝜏∗) ;  𝑋(𝑝∗, 𝜏) − 𝑦(𝑝∗) is not in 𝐺 ,𝑧∗ is efficient in 𝐺 . 
Here 𝐻-households , 𝑥-consumption vector, 𝐶 -consumption set s.t. budget constraint 𝑞 ∙ 𝑥 ≦ 0;𝐶ℎ  
closed convex and bounded below by a vector 𝛼ℎ , and contains vector with every component 
negative, the preference ordering is continuous , formally if 𝑥2  is preferred or indifferent to 𝑥1 and 
0 < 𝑡 < 1  then 𝑡𝑥2 + (1 − 𝑡)𝑥1 ≻ 𝑥1 ,there is no satiation consumption in 𝐶ℎ  (The economic 
principle of satiation is the effect whereby the more of a good one possesses the less one is willing to 
give up in order to get more of it). 
 If 𝑧 ≦  0; 𝑧 ∈ 𝐺 ; 𝐺 is closed, ∃?̅? ; 𝑧 ≦ ?̅? ∀𝑧 > 0;  in closure 𝐺 ,𝐺 is convex.  
𝑈(𝑥1 , … . , 𝑥𝐻) indirect utility function 𝑉(𝑞) = 𝑈(𝑥1(𝑞), … . . , 𝑥𝐻(𝑞)) 
Individual indirect utility function:𝑣ℎ(𝑞) = 𝑢ℎ ( 𝑥ℎ(𝑞)) 
equation 56 
𝑈(𝑥1 , … . , 𝑥𝐻) = 𝑊(𝑢1(𝑥1), … . . , 𝑢𝐻(𝑥𝐻)) 
Aggregate demand is : 
equation 57 
𝑋(𝑞) = ∑ 𝑥ℎ (𝑞)
ℎ
 
The assumptions on the production possibility set are: 
1. 𝑧 ≤ 0, 𝑧 ∈ 𝐺 every production p-lan in which nothing is produced in positive quantity  
2. 0 ∈ 𝐺  i.e. complete inactivity  
3. 𝐺 is closed  
4. ∃?̅? ; 𝑧 ≦ 𝛼 ̅ in the convex closure of 𝐺  
5. G is convex  
Indirect welfare function is given as: 
equation 58 
𝑉(𝑞) = 𝑈(𝑥1(𝑞), … . , 𝑥𝐻(𝑞)) 
Individual indirect utility: 
𝑈(𝑥1 , … . , 𝑥𝐻) = 𝑊(𝑢1(𝑥1), … … , 𝑢𝐻(𝑥𝐻)) 
𝑈 is a continuous function of (𝑥1 , … . , 𝑥𝐻) 
‖𝑥‖ > 𝑀   where all the attainable vectors in the set satisfy ‖𝑥‖ < 𝑀  we restrict attention to  
equation 59 
𝑞 ≧ 0  ∑ 𝑞𝑖 = 1 𝑖  
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{𝑞|𝑋(𝑞) ∈ 𝐺 } this set is closed  
equation 60 
𝑥′ = 𝑋(𝑞′)  ;   (‖𝑥𝑛
′ ‖/‖𝑥𝑛‖) ‖𝜉‖ > ‖𝛼 ̅‖ 
equation 61 
𝑏 = ∑ 𝛼ℎℎ  ;𝑥𝑛 = ∑ 𝑥𝑛
ℎ
ℎ  
equation 62 
(‖𝑥𝑛
′ ‖/‖𝑥𝑛‖)𝑥𝑛 ≧ (‖𝑥𝑛
′ ‖/‖𝑥𝑛‖)𝑏 
𝜉 ≧ 0 
equation 63 
𝑉′(𝑞) ∙ 𝑞 = ∑
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑞𝑘
𝑞𝑘 = 0 
𝑉 is a homogenous of degree zero in 𝑞 . And 𝑉′ ≦ 0 if and only if 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑞𝑘
= 0. 
 
Mankiw problem 
An open economy has the production function 𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑘), where 𝑦 is output per worker and 𝑘 is 
capital per worker. The capital stock adjusts so that the after-tax marginal product of capital equals 
the exogenously given world interest rate 𝑟 the question here is how much will the tax cut increase 
wages? One solution here is Cobb-Douglas production function. Where: Y-the total output  ;F(K,L)- 
production function  ; K-total capital stock  ;T-total taxes ; t-taxes per worker ;τ-capital tax rate  
equation 64 
𝑌 = 𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿) = 𝑓(𝑘)𝐿, 𝑘 =
𝐾
𝐿
     ;  𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾𝛼𝐿1−𝛼 = 𝐴𝐾𝛼𝐿, 𝛼 ∈ [0,1] 
With taxes, firms look to maximize: 
equation 65 
𝐽 = max
𝐾,𝐿
(1 − 𝜏)[𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿) − 𝑤𝐿] − 𝑟𝐾     𝐽 = max
𝐾,𝐿
(1 − 𝜏)[𝑓(𝑘) − 𝑤𝐿] − 𝑟𝐾 
Where 𝜏 is a capital tax rate, 𝑤 is a wage per worker,𝑟 is exogenous tax rate.Then FOC then 
becomes: 
equation 66 
𝜕𝐽
𝜕𝐾
= (1 − 𝜏)𝑓′(𝑘) − 𝑟;   
𝜕𝐽
𝜕𝐿
= (1 − 𝜏)[𝑓′(𝑘) − 𝑤 ]    
Therefore, the optimality conditions imply that: 
equation 67 
 𝑟 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑓’(𝑘) ; 𝑤 = 𝑓(𝑘) − 𝑓′(𝑘)𝑘 
Total taxes are: 𝑇 = 𝜏[𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿) − 𝑤𝐿]        ; taxes per worker are : 𝑡 = 𝜏[𝑓(𝑘) − 𝑤] = 𝜏𝑓′(𝑘)𝑘  
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Then the change in taxes per worker, given the tax rate, is: 
equation 68 
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝜏
= 𝑓′(𝑘)𝑘 + 𝜏[𝑓′(𝑘) + 𝑓′′(𝑘)𝑘 ]
𝑑𝑘
𝑑𝜏
         ;   
𝑑𝑤
𝑑𝜏
= [𝑓′(𝑘) − 𝑓′(𝑘) − 𝑓′′(𝑘)𝑘]
𝑑𝑘
𝑑𝜏
= −𝑓′′(𝑘)𝑘
𝑑𝑘
𝑑𝑡
 
To find the change in wages, we differentiate the second optimality condition for the per worker 
wages to obtain:  
equation 69 
𝑑𝑟
𝑑𝜏
= 0    ;   
𝑑𝑘
𝑑𝜏
=
𝑓′(𝑘)
(1−𝜏)𝑓′′(𝑘)
   ;  
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝜏
= 𝑓′(𝑘)𝑘  ;  
𝑑𝑤
𝑑𝜏
=
𝑓′(𝑘)𝑘
1−𝜏
= −
1
1−𝜏
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝜏
  ;  
𝑑𝑤
𝑑𝜏
= −
1
1−𝜏
 
equation 70 
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝜏
= 𝑓′(𝑘)𝑘 + 𝜏[𝑓′(𝑘) + 𝑓′′(𝑘)𝑘];
𝑑𝑘
𝑑𝜏
= 𝑓′(𝑘)𝑘 +
𝜏
1 − 𝜏  
[𝑓′(𝑘)]2 + 𝑓′(𝑘)𝑓′′(𝑘)𝑘 
𝑓′′(𝑘)
 
=
𝜏
1 − 𝜏
𝑓′(𝑘)2
𝑓′′(𝑘)
+
1
1 − 𝜏
𝑓′(𝑘)𝑘 =
𝑓′(𝑘)
1 − 𝜏 
[𝜏
𝑓′(𝑘)
𝑓′′(𝑘)
+ 𝑘]  
The static effect of capital tax cut is : 
𝑑𝑤
𝑑𝜏
= −
1
1−𝜏
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝜏
 ;   
𝑑𝑤
𝑑𝜏
=
𝑓′(𝑘)𝑘 
1−𝜏 
𝑓′(𝑘)
1−𝜏 
[𝜏
𝑓′(𝑘)
𝑓′′(𝑘)
+𝑘]
= −
1
𝜏
𝑓′(𝑘)
𝑘𝑓′′(𝑘)
+1 
 
Using the Cobb-Douglas production function, we have that:  
equation 71 
𝑓′(𝑘)
𝑘𝑓′′(𝑘)
= −
1
1−𝛼
   ;   
𝑑𝑤
𝑑𝑡
= −
1−𝛼
1−𝜏−𝛼
 
Therefore, the dynamic effect of a capital tax cut on wages is: 
equation 72 
𝑑𝑤
𝑑𝑡
= −
1 − 𝛼
1 − 𝜏 − 𝛼
 
This result shows that in small open economy, labor bears 100% of small capital income tax, The fact 
that, starting at a positive tax rate, the burden of a tax increase exceeds revenue collection due to 
the first-order deadweight loss 
Conclusion  
 
This paper made attempt to review the past and the current literature on the optimal tax theory, 
empirical and theoretical. The developments of the tax theory are improving the tax policies around 
the world. One of the most important improvements is the worldwide trend towards reduction of 
taxation of capital income. Also, the worldwide tendency toward flatter income tax rates. The 
motivation of the original Mirrlees (1971) paper was to provide a framework for which to derive an 
optimal structure of tax rates, which turned out to be flat for a broad range. Or as Mirrlees said :“I 
must confess that I had expected the rigorous analysis of income-taxation in the utilitarian manner to 
provide an argument for high tax rates,” Professor Mirrlees wrote. “It has not done so.” He was 
surprised by his conservative conclusions. Those conclusions are: Linear tax schedule is desirable, 
except supply of highly educated labor is much more inelastic from the utility function, and especially 
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negative income tax is recommended for the workers that earn lower than some level, Income 
taxation is of no use when battling inequality, Some complementary taxes for  the income tax will be 
of use here…such as taxes that depend on the time spent at work and workers ability and the income 
from such labor. The problem lies here as prof.Mirrlees wrote:” but if it is true, as our results suggest, 
that the income tax is not a very satisfactory alternative, this objection must be weighed against the 
great desirability of finding some effective method of offsetting the unmerited favors that some of us 
receive from our genes and family advantages”. This is contradictory to the requirement of the optimal 
tax,i.e. that optimal tax must not have effect on the wealth of the society where it has being levied. 
The sum of mechanical effect, welfare effect, and behavioral effect should equal to zero.  
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